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Abstract: The intent of this article is to explore the scope and working of “framework-rules” in relation to self-organization 
in urban development, both theoretically and empirically. It explores the strategies promoted in Oosterwold (Almere, The 
Netherland), and the framework-rules that discipline its emergent development, without wanting to suggest that Oosterwold 
is a “best practice”. It is an extreme case that helps us to broaden our thinking about governing urban development.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Almere Oosterwold is an experimental large-scale transfor-
mation in the Netherlands, which will be developed mostly 
on a greenfield surface of 43 km², generating a low-density 
urban area (with the space for between 15,000 and 18,000 
new dwellings). Oosterwold has no master plan or zon-
ing map, but only a limited number of “framework-rules” 
(Moroni 2015). Oosterwold will therefore be developed in 
the next twenty years by largely relying on self-organization. 
According to the strategy promoted by the Municipality, 
this is an “experimental garden”1 as there is little experience 
of this kind in the Netherlands, nor elsewhere (Municipality 
of Almere 2009). The general idea for Oosterwold is to have 
a fully demand-driven large-scale transformation which, 
with the passage of time, will emerge by small private ini-
tiatives. All this without any direct public investment as re-
gards collective infrastructures or land preparation.
The intent of this article is to explore the scope and work-
ing of framework-rules in relation to self-organization in 
urban development, both theoretically and empirically. 
It explores the strategies promoted by the city of Almere, 
and the framework-rules that discipline its emergent devel-
opment, without wanting to suggest that Almere is a “best 
practice.” It is an extreme case that helps us to broaden our 
thinking about governing urban development. The paper is 
divided into four sections: the first Section structures the 
main theoretical questions; the second Section analyses the 
case study of Almere Oosterwold; the third Section discuss-
es the results and evidence; the fourth Section presents the 
general conclusions.
II. THE PROBLEM 
2.1 Emergent orders and urban planning 
Michael Polanyi says that an emergent order “is achieved 
among human beings by allowing them to interact with 
each other on their own initiative.” The crucial point is that 
“the use of these spontaneous forces implies that many fea-
tures of the process creating the order will be beyond our 
control” (Polanyi 1951/1998, p. 195). An emergent order is 
produced by voluntary actions respecting few general and 
abstract rules. In this case, individuals may freely use their 
knowledge; while society may employ its dispersed knowl-
edge (Hayek 1945). An emergent order is therefore neither a 
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specific product of deliberate human action nor a full natu-
ral phenomenon independent from human action. Rather, 
it is the result of human action but not of human design 
(Hayek 1967). In other words, it is the emerged product of 
aggregated actions of agents which shows a certain level of 
coherence or patterns. Patterns are not mere aggregations 
of actions but systemic wholes (Harper & Endres, 2012). 
Thus, an emergent order differs both from “chaos” and 
“made order.” On the one hand, it cannot be compared with 
a made order since it possesses an emergent and uninten-
tional character (nobody planned it in detail or can exactly 
predict its evolution). On the other hand, nor can it be com-
pared with chaos, since it possesses a certain level of inter-
nal regularities or patterns. 
Jane Jacobs was the first who clearly described the city as 
a particular kind of complex emergent order (Ikeda 2011, 
2012; Ikeda & Callahan 2014). In general, Jacobs looked at 
the city as a living system: a dynamic order, the place of ac-
tions and the product of actions; a never-ending process of 
transformation and adaptation (Cozzolino, 2015b). For this 
reason, Jacobs’ view must be considered a watershed in the 
field of urban studies. After Jacobs, the challenge seems to 
be that of testing the concept of emergent order not only to 
describe the city, but also to reflect on how to regulate its 
evolution. In this regard Mark Pennington (2002, p. 56), 
writes that: 
the myriad interdependencies that link the patch-
work of land uses of both urban and rural environ-
ments are classic examples of spontaneous social and 
economic orders, the complexities of which cannot be 
overseen synoptically. As Jane Jacobs’ work demon-
strates so well, the fundamental human character of 
land-use processes makes the form, pattern and place 
of development unpredictable and beyond the scope 
of planners, whether technocratic experts or members 
of citizens’ juries.
Land-use plans and building codes play a crucial role in 
the extent to which emergent configurations may occur in 
cities and, consequently, in their propensity to host unex-
pected adaptations over time (Ikeda forthcoming). Thus, in 
a strict sense, a reliance on emergent orders means prefer-
ring framework-rules that should guarantee enough room 
for people to act on their own creative impulses (Holcombe 
2011). In this perspective, given certain framework-rules, 
the independent and differentiated members of a system 
may self-coordinate into an adaptive and ordered con-
figuration that activates the dispersed knowledge (Moroni 
2007). In this regard, the recent theoretical and practi-
cal innovations in the Netherlands seem to offer valuable 
insights. Today in the Netherlands we might be observ-
ing a paradigmatic shift from a comprehensive-integrated 
planning approach, to the idea of “organic development” 
(Buitelaar et al. 2014).
2.2 Framework-rules for self-organizing emergent orders
Agents’ actions in space take place within certain rules, 
which may be more or less favorable to the creation of viable 
emergent orders. This idea can be schematized using four 
correlated concepts: (i) “framework-rules,” (ii) “individual 
actions,” (iii) “time dimension,” and (iv) “emergent order.” 
Figure 1: The interplay among rules, actions, and orders
Framework-rules have three main features (Moroni, 2010 
and 2013). First of all, they are open enough to guarantee 
broad scope for experimentation; in this way rules allow 
agents to act according to their knowledge and choose the 
technical and design solutions that they prefer (note that 
rules of this kind may be stringent2). Second, they are as ge-
neric as possible and applicable to the whole area at issue (in 
the sense that they should not refer to any specific situation 
or land). Third, they focus on permissible and non-permis-
sible actions (in particular, to avoid negative externalities) 
rather than on a comprehensive end-state. 











Framework-rules discipline individual behavior in space, 
conditioning the range of possible actions that individuals 
may or may not take. Every action contributes to a complex 
emergent process of space modification and adaptation (in 
this sense every action can influence or provoke other ac-
tions). Actions are definable as purposeful behaviors taken 
by agents. Conscious or purposeful behaviors are, by their 
nature, clearly in contrast to unconscious or not purpose-
ful behavior (Mises 1963/1998, p. 11). Moreover, free actions 
are distinguishable from actions that are the result of spe-
cific commands (Hayek 1960, p. 48). Private initiatives, in 
respect of the framework-rules, play a vital role in shaping 
the environment into a process of real self-organization. 
Therefore, public intervention aimed at deliberately con-
structing specific orders is kept to a minimum level (Ikeda 
2004).
The time dimension is crucial in this regard. Order 
emerges incrementally over time (step by step), within 
a process of adaptation and mutual adjustments among 
agents (Buitelaar et al. 2014). All this happens according to 
agents’ actual needs and opportunities. In this perspective, 
the framework-rules cannot predefine the final detailed 
outcome; rather, they leave the future open to a wide array 
of solutions, within a process of long-term transformation. 
The main point is that in this case (framework-)rules are 
not used instrumentally to obtain specific (future) spatial 
configurations, but rather to facilitate social-spatial inter-
action among agents (Brennan & Buchanan, 2000) and to 
keep people (concentrated in a place) in peace with each 
other (Epstein 1995). 
THE CASE STUDY3
3.1 Traditional Dutch approach vs. organic development
The Dutch have a long history of the active coordination of 
land use by public bodies (in cooperation with private par-
ties). The internationally well-known results of the large-
scale land reclamations (inpoldering) are a clear example of 
how “the Dutch created Holland.” This active land-use plan-
ning goes further than the passive planning which is prac-
ticed in most other countries by merely steering, through 
the powers of the planning system, the initiatives taken by 
citizens and firms to change the use of land (Needham 2014, 
p. 19). Instead of only avoiding the coexistence of incompat-
ible land uses (WRR 1998; Van der Cammen & De Klerk 
2003), Dutch public bodies were traditionally involved in 
regulating, financing, organizing and constructing inte-
grated developments (Buitelaar, Galle & Sorel 2014). This 
integrated comprehensive approach is a distinctive feature 
of the Dutch style of spatial planning in comparison to oth-
er countries (Nadin et al. 1997); whole areas were designed 
by planners, including housing, infrastructure, green and 
public services. This “planning by projects” (Needham 
2014, p. 20) has been typical of the large-scale development 
of suburbia since the early 1990s.4 Dutch national planning 
has gained an “almost mythical status” in the internation-
al academic literature (Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000). The 
country is acknowledged for its “high degree of spatial or-
dering” (Healey 2004, p. 63). This approach is often tightly 
connected with an extensive system of rules and regulation, 
eloquently summarized by the title of Faludi’s and Van der 
Valk’s (1994) book Rule and Order.
Throughout the years urban land-use planning has be-
come more legalistic as there is a growing number of le-
gal requirements. New rules have been implemented with 
regard to flora and fauna, air quality, soil contamination, 
noise nuisance, external safety, archaeology and heritage, 
water quality and quantity, and more (e.g. Beunen & Van 
Assche, 2013; Buitelaar, Galle & Salet  2013). Paradoxically 
those rules—aimed at ensuring a “right” land use—have 
increasingly become a millstone around the planners’ and 
developers’ necks. This is because the preparatory stage of 
land-use plans has become very complex and time-con-
suming to meet all these, sometimes contradictory, require-
ments (Buitelaar, Galle & Salet 2013). 
3.2 The economic crisis as a turning point for the Dutch 
       development model
This comprehensive integrated approach seems less and 
less to be the favorable development model. This is mainly 
the result of the financial crisis that started at the end of 
2008 and the economic recession(s) that followed, which 
had great effects on (re)development plans at the local level. 
Many plans had to be postponed or even canceled as prop-
erty developers faced a drop in demand for new houses, of-
fice space, and retail space. The losses that resulted induced 
them to retreat from public-private partnerships, leaving 
local governments with undeveloped land and growing in-
terest costs (Buitelaar & Bregman 2016). 
A more “organic” development process is seen by many 
as a feasible alternative approach. In this case, the role of 
the municipality is enabling instead of active, and the type 
of management could be characterized as process manage-
ment rather than project management (Buitelaar et al. 2012; 







2014). Urban development in this respect is less dependent 
on a public-private partnership between the municipality 
and a property developer as it was in the comprehensive in-
tegrated approach. Instead, private initiatives of end-users 
gradually shape the development. Regulating land uses be-
comes less an act of planning and more one of organizing 
private initiatives. Organic development might be (or ought 
to be) accompanied by less complicated rules and thereby a 
less complex rule system so as to enable private initiatives. 
This need for “simplification” seems to have received broad 
consensus in recent Dutch academic and policy debates. For 
instance, the legal system of spatial planning, environmen-
tal protection, and nature conservation is considered too 
complex (Ministry of I&M, 2011), and therefore a major re-
form of the legal system around planning and environmen-
tal laws is taking place at the time of writing. Improving the 
way municipalities can facilitate organic development pro-
cesses is one of the goals of the new laws. 
3.3 Oosterwold as an extreme case of organic develop-
ment
One of the Dutch municipalities trying to organize for “or-
ganic development” is Almere. Almere can be seen as an 
interesting example of moving from one side of the spec-
trum to the other: from the blue-print approach to more 
spontaneous development (Cozzolino 2015a). The city is 
an “extreme case” (Flyvbjerg 2006) of the change in Dutch 
planning and development. Almere is situated approxi-
mately 30 kilometers northeast of Amsterdam. The city was 
literally designed on the drawing board as a “New Town” 
because it is built on “new land” resulting from reclama-
tion of a part of the IJsselmeer during the 1960s. From 1977 
onwards, over 75,000 dwellings were built, providing hous-
ing for over 190,000 residents. Its construction was primar-
ily focused on the production of houses by means of strong 
top-down state interventions and investments. This hap-
pened following rigid and detailed blueprint designs. Entire 
districts of Almere were built all at once with not much 
space for further adaptations. Almere-Buiten, Almere-
Haven, and Almere-Stad are typical examples. 
In 2006, the appointment of a new alderman Adri 
Duivesteijn would prove to be a key moment in the de-
velopment in Almere. A former member of parliament, 
Duivesteijn is a strong advocate of self-build housing 
(Oosterman & Retegan 2015; Oosterman 2015). The pre-
vious blueprint city, developed without much citizen in-
volvement, is now a frontrunner in facilitating private 
initiatives and smaller landlords. The Almere neighbor-
hoods Noorderplassen-West and Homeruskwartier are tell-
ing examples of this new approach. In both neighborhoods 
the final effect has been a mix of architectural diversity and 
innovations (Collison 2011).
The latest plan for the development of a new part of 
Almere—Oosterwold—goes a step further than “just” is-
suing plots for self-build homes. Oosterwold’s development 
relies on a “radical strategy of self-organization” (RRAAM 
et al. 2012). It is probably the most “organic” development 
in the Netherlands, certainly the largest. 
City Project Dimension 
(ha)
Type of development
Almere Oosterwold 4,300 Urban extension
Utrecht A12 1,150 Urban extension
Amsterdam Amstel III 250 Redevelopment
Assen Havenwartier 125 Redevelopment
Bunnik Vinkenburg 120 Urban extension
Almere Homeruskwartier 106 New neighborhood
Rotterdam Coolhavenelland 36 Urban regeneration
Amsterdam Cruquiusgebled 17 Redevelopment
Deventer Havenkwartier 15 Redevelopment
Nijmegen Vossenpels 15 Redevelopment
Groningen Ebbingekwartier 9 Redevelopment
Table 1. Examples of organic development projects in The 
Netherlands (source: Rauws 2015).
Figure 2: The location of Almere in The Netherlands











Oosterwold covers an area of approximately 43 km2, 
mostly undeveloped (agricultural) land. It is situated in 
two municipalities: Almere and Zeewolde. In the long run 
around 15,000 houses, 20 hectares of office space, 135 hect-
ares of industrial sites, 1,800 hectares of urban agricultural 
land, and 450 hectares of new public green could be devel-
oped (Gemeente Almere & Gemeente Zeewolde 2013, p. 
23). Could, because there is no predefined program. Based 
on the regulations for Oosterwold, these figures are “maxi-
mum thresholds” for the long term (twenty years), which 
could be developed or not. Both extreme scenarios—and all 
the results in-between—are acceptable according to the de-
velopment strategy of Almere. 
A first main difference between the approach chosen in 
Oosterwold and the traditional comprehensive integrated 
approach is the former’s emphasis on demand rather than 
supply. In the comprehensive integrated approach, plan-
ning (and sometimes even construction) started before 
buyers and tenants were in the picture. In Oosterwold, the 
municipality draws up a scenario and welcomes develop-
ers’ initiatives. This development is not done by means of 
a public-private partnership between the municipality and 
one or more large developers. Instead anyone—individu-
als or groups, professional developers and housing associa-
tions—interested in developing in Oosterwold is invited to 
participate. Only a limited number of rules are introduced 
to regulate the future transformation, giving guidance so 
that each individual initiative will contribute step by step 
to the transformation of the area (MVRDV 2011). Step-by-
step development can be seen as the opposite of integrated 
development. This latter traditional mode of development is 
even deliberately discouraged by the way in which the plan 
regulates land use.
 The second main difference between the approach cho-
sen in Oosterwold and the comprehensive integrated ap-
proach is closely related to the first: instead of using a 
comprehensive land-use plan to organize, finance and regu-
late the land-use transformation, the single/individual plot 
is considered as the focal point. By focusing on this small 
scale rather than the final aggregate result, the development 
is the opposite of the comprehensive type, and in many re-
spects, becomes emergent. 
3.4 The framework-rules of Oosterwold
The Municipality enables the development of Oosterwold 
through a reduced set of framework-rules and parameters 
which are mostly generic and not map-dependent (there 
is no zoning plan within the Oosterwold area, apart from 
three areas designated as non-developable). Moreover, local 
government prevents the introduction of specifications and 
normative measures additional to what is already regulated 
at national level (contrary to what often happens in the field 
of land-use planning). The land in Oosterwold is partially 
Figure 3: The Oosterwold area







owned by the national government, and a public agency 
manages the process of land selling. 
Land-use developments are regulated in the Oosterwold 
“plan” (bestemmingsplan). Rules regulating the develop-
ment of Oosterwold are generic (there is no predetermined 
land subdivision) and they mostly aim to avoid conflicts 
among initiatives instead of prescribing a certain kind of 
end state (Gemeente Almere & Gemeente Zeewolde 2013, 
p. 43). These rules regulate the relationship between pri-
vate actions and the public interest, and assess fair play 
between existing landowners and development by new 
initiators. Public investments will follow private invest-
ments, instead of the other way round, as is more com-
mon in the Netherlands. These rules regulate not the entire 
Oosterwold area, but only the part on the territory of the 
municipality of Almere. This is called phase 1. The other 
part of Oosterwold, on the territory of the municipality 
of Zeewolde, will be regulated later on. However, the gen-
eral plan is sufficiently clear for initiators to be able to ap-
ply for a building permit (omgevingsvergunning) with the 
shortest procedure.5 Particularly interesting is article 13 
(Ontwikkelregels) of the plan: the development rules. Other 
articles define for instance the concepts used in the plan 
and regulate the existing land uses. 
Plots are developed according to the development rules 
(article 13). Once initiators can demonstrate that the rules 
will be respected, they sign a contract with the municipal-
ity. This private law contract is used by the municipality 
in addition to the public law plan to ensure cost recovery 
for planning costs and possible future infrastructure in-
vestments. After signing the contract initiators can start 
to build on their plot. In order to coordinate different pri-
vate initiatives, and monitoring the overall development of 
Oosterwold, the municipality provides an open-source map 
representing the location of different initiatives, as well as 
their phase of development.6
The framework-rules in Oosterwold mainly cover four 
issues: (i) the choice and the spatial layout of plots, (ii) 
permitted uses, (iii) the floor area ratio, and (iv) the self-
reliance of plots (in terms of energy production, sanitation, 
and financial issues).
Choice and layout of plots. Initiators can choose between 
three types of plot: “standard plot,” “agricultural plot,” and 
“landscape plot.” The total amount of land allocated to each 
type of plot across Oosterwold is regulated: “Standard plot” 
73%; “Agricultural plot” 10%, and “Landscape plot” 17%. 
These types of plot have different parameters and must be 
developed with a maximum and minimum of land uses 
(two adjacent plots can be combined to meet the maximum 
and minimum demands). See the following table:
Land-use parameters Plot type
Standard Agriculture Landscape
Buildable area ≤25% ≤7.0% ≤6.0%
Infrastructure (incl. parking) ≤11.0% ≤2.0% ≤2.3%
Publicly accessible  
“natural green” 
≥0.0% ≥0.0% ≥80%
Publicly accessible  
“dispersed green”
≥7.0% ≥1.5% ≥1.5%
Water ≥2.0% ≥1.5% ≥2.3%
Agriculture ≥50.0% ≥80.0% ≥0.0
Total subdivision in Ooster-
wold
73% 10% 17%
Table 2. Plots types and land-use parameters.
Initiators can choose any plot size in any shape. This 
freedom is restricted only by the financial possibilities of 
initiators and the availability of land. In particular, the 
availability of land is restricted by two public conditions. 
The first condition is that, at the end of the development, 
the overall subdivision of land uses in Oosterwold should be 
equal to: 20% housing, retail, services and office buildings; 
6.5% pavement; 20.5% of public green; 2% water, and 51% 
agriculture (the area manager is responsible for controlling 
that the aggregate sum of all initiatives respect such param-
eter).
The second condition states that all the land in 
Oosterwold is available for initiators except for three specif-
ic zones, which have detailed collective previsions: the area 
indicated as Eemvalley developable only as landscape plot; 
an area reserved for a future railway; certain areas indicat-
ed as forest in which real estate development is prohibited 
(however, the mayor and aldermen can decide to deviate 
from this rule for publicly accessible facilities if they con-
tribute to the “recreational attractiveness” of Oosterwold 
and do not “disproportionally damage” the existing values 
of the landscape). 
List of permitted buildings uses. Some specific uses in 
Oosterwold are clearly forbidden, such as large-scale shops 
(bigger than 2,000 m²), intensive livestock farms, casinos, 
and brothels. Apart from these, all other uses are permis-
sible: the rules allow for residential development, services, 
hotels/B&Bs, infrastructures, offices, commercial (shops, 











bars, cafes and restaurants), industrial (within limits of en-
vironmental classification, listed separately in an appendix 
based on national regulation). (As regards industrial activi-
ties, the mayor has the power to grant exemptions if the 
pressure of these activities on the environment is equal or 
less than those activities already permitted).
Floor Area Ratio. A Floor Area Ratio (FAR) of 0.5 is ap-
plied to the buildable area of each plot. An exemption from 
this rule is possible, and the FAR can be stretched to 1. In 
that case the extra built-up area should be compensated on 
an adjacent plot so that the combined plots have a maxi-
mum FAR of 0.5. In general, there are no (local) restrictions 
as regards the number of floors or the maximum height of 
buildings, as well as there are no specific restrictions as re-
gards building designs, construction materials, and techno-
logical solutions. 
Self-reliant plots. All initiators in Oosterwold have to take 
care of their own energy production, sanitation, and nega-
tive externalities. These rules mainly aim to avoid external 
effects, instead of regulating a certain predetermined end. 
Therefore, as regards ecological values, public safety, noise, 
or water, no “uneven situation should emerge.” In this re-
gard, in the appendix of the plan various “decision trees” 
are added to help initiators to determine: whether or not 
their application will meet these requirements; and whether 
further proofing is necessary (by means of investigations) 
or other steps are required (request a deviation from exist-
ing rules). The point is that these rules oblige initiators to 
internalize all negative external effects. To provide some ex-
amples, these rules require that: anyone who wants to start 
a business in Oosterwold must keep a certain distance from 
adjacent plots in order to internalize the external effect of 
nuisances (the distance depends on the kind of activity, 
specified in an appendix, and activities that involve a great 
deal of noise must be situated on a larger plot);8 facilities for 
generating sustainable energy (such as a wind turbine) may 
not hamper the possibilities of other plots to generate sus-
tainable energy on their own; each initiator should connect 
its plot to the existing road network and provide sufficient 
parking spaces according to national norms for parking 
spaces (the City can decide to deviate from these guidelines 
and accept fewer parking spaces, if there are no particular 
problems).
DISCUSSION
With Oosterwold the municipality of Almere is clearly 
promoting and favoring the realization of a particular 
urban-agricultural lifestyle. However, this is certainly a 
remarkable case study that highlights the relationship be-
tween self-coordination and planning. Moreover, it is a 
good example of large-scale development governed only by 
few public framework-rules (without previous public in-
vestments). 
The framework-rules for Oosterwold are generic and do 
not refer to any specific situation or plot. Instead of having 
different regimes for different zones within the Oosterwold 
development area, framework-rules are applied equally 
Rules for initiators Degree of freedom Comments 
Plots availability High Almost all the land of Oosterwold is open for private actions. Initiators can 
choose any plot shape, size, and dimension. 
Plots layout Low Plot layout is determined by land-use parameters ensuring the agricultural 
vocation of Oosterwold. 
FAR Low The density of Oosterwold is low and will be always concentrated in the 
middle of plots. Once all the FAR is used, there will not be any room for 
further expansion.
Buildings High Initiators are free to design their buildings according to their preferences, 
knowledge and resources.
Admitted uses High All uses are permitted with exception of large-scale shops, intensive livestock 
farms, casinos, and brothels.
Self-reliance High Initiators are free to find or use the technological solution they consider more 
suitable to internalize negative externalities.
Table 3. “Degrees of freedom”







to the total area. They discipline the overall development 
of Oosterwold by regulating the construction of plots (for 
instance by setting certain parameters that the plots must 
respect within their boundaries, and the relation that plots 
shall have with their neighbors). All this is reached by set-
ting rules that mainly aim to avoid certain negative exter-
nalities (Moroni 2012), and set few positive conditions to 
facilitate the creation of collective benefits (for instance, the 
edge of every plot must be publicly accessible and at least 
two meters wide). Moreover, the preference for using “open” 
rules leaves more room for initiators to find new solutions, 
and experiment with innovative actions. This leaves space 
for the greater use of dispersed knowledge. 
Although all the plots will be mostly devoted to agricul-
tural activities, the way in which the framework-rules reg-
ulate the list of permitted uses in Oosterwold allows for a 
large degree of flexibility to initiators, who can voluntary 
choose the use (or combination of uses) of their plots, as 
long as they respect the requirements of the overall land-use 
subdivision. Therefore, over time, the spatial distribution of 
activities will be driven by social and market demand. 
The transformation is incremental. The framework-rules 
last for twenty years, within which an independent (but at 
the same time correlated) succession of private initiatives 
will shape the emergent character of the area. All initiatives 
will be correlated to each other; in fact, to include new plots 
within the previously built environment, all initiators must 
meet certain conditions. These conditions will ensure the 
evolution of an overall organic development between differ-
ent and independent initiatives (for instance, the creation 
of the road network, open green areas, pedestrian and cycle 
paths, etc.). In other words: step by step, each initiative will 
be inserted into a framework, respecting and reinforcing 
the evolutive process of transformation. 
However, the framework-rules introduce some condi-
tions which tightly bind the future of Oosterwold, con-
straining the “range” of possible emergent orders. We may 
call these conditions “invariants.” Such invariants are un-
movable and stable conditions that must be shared by all 
initiators: their function is to raise the level of predictability 
of future transformations toward some preferred collective 
situation. Obviously, the more use is made of “invariants” 
the less room there will be for unpredictable initiatives. 
Three “invariants” are of particular interest: (i) the as-
signment of particular prescriptions to three different areas; 
(ii) the total amount of buildable FAR (floor area ratio); and 
(iii) the overall land subdivision. Therefore, although the 
development of Oosterwold comprises a great degree of in-
ternal flexibility (and it closely relies on self-organization), 
to some extent part of the final configuration of Oosterwold 
is already known since the beginning. 
The first is a case of “spatial invariant.” Three areas have 
been withheld from free private initiatives receiving specific 
vocations: first, the Eemvalley that has landscape destina-
tion; second, an area preserved for future railway construc-
tion; third, an area indicated as forest prohibiting real estate 
development. Spatial invariants introduce stable conditions 
that do not complicate the transformation of Oosterwold; 
they are very simple and easily understandable. 
The second is a case of “dimensional invariant” as regards 
the maximum density of Oosterwold. A Floor Area Ratio 
(FAR) of 0.5 is applied to the buildable area of each plot. This 
means that when and whether all the FAR is built, there will 
be no space for future expansions. In other words: the plan 
sets a clear limit on the future growth of Oosterwold, which 
compels the area to remain a suburb. However, after twenty 
years the rules may be re-discussed, with the possibility of 
increasing the FAR. 
The third is a case of “performative invariant” as regards 
the overall land-use subdivision. This condition is more 
complicated than the others. The final configuration of 
Oosterwold (that will be reached through unknown future 
voluntary private actions) has to conform to a general and 
generic land-use subdivision (that is: 20% housing, retail, 
services and office buildings; 6.5% pavement; 20.5% of pub-
lic green; 2% water and 51% urban-agriculture) which disci-
plines the final combination of aggregate actions. Moreover, 
the implementation of this process is complicated. On the 
one hand, the area manager has a fundamental role in or-
ganizing the initiatives; on the other hand, as the area is 
developed, the space for new initiatives will decrease, and 
the implementation will become in its turn more compli-
cated. In brief: with the passage of time, in order to obtain 
the general overall land-use subdivision, the range of pos-
sible initiatives will diminish, and the rules will be more 
prescriptive. 
FINAL REMARKS
The (public) framework-rules for Oosterwold have been 
designed to allow a high degree of flexibility; however, in-
evitably, such framework-rules are top-down and imposed, 
while the aggregation of all initiatives (i.e., the final spatial 
configurations) will be obviously mainly emergent and bot-
tom-up.











Completely emergent configurations are by definition 
unpredictable and beyond anyone control: evidently, this 
is not the case of Oosterwold. In fact, the emergent de-
velopment of Oosterwold is influenced by certain “public 
conditions” which determine and control some salient as-
pects: for instance, the agricultural vocation of the whole 
area. However, in the opinions of some initiators, these 
framework-rules enable the action of private actors and the 
self-organization of different individuals having similar 
lifestyles.
The transformation of Oosterwold is now slowly emerg-
ing in the wake of small initiatives (so far, plots average 
ranges from 1,000 to 3,500 m²). On May 2016, 7 “initiators” 
started to build a total of 42 houses, and other 30-40 will 
start to build their plot before the end of the year. Besides 
them, 140 “initiators” started the application process for 
new developments (2016). 
Three types of initiator are recognizable: (i) “the self-
builder,” a single initiator who directly build and develop 
the plot; (ii) “the cooperative,” self-organized initiators that 
jointly act to diminish certain collective costs (for instance 
the costs regarding energy production or sanitation, as well 
as the design costs, or procedural costs); (iii) “the real es-
tate,” initiators who buy, organize, build, and then sell plots 
to future inhabitants.
Most of the initiatives are concentrated in the same area 
sharing the road previously developed by the first initia-
tor. In this regards, it is noticeable that initiators have vol-
untarily created a “road-association” to share all the costs 
regarding road development and subsequent maintenance.
Oosterwold is definitely an interesting experiment. 
But, there are some critical points that could create prob-
lems during the development. For instance: the degree of 
discretionality of the area director, and of the mayor and 
aldermen; the concrete form and content of the signed 
agreements between the public party and the private ones; 
possible frictions between initiators for collective spaces 
construction and maintenance (for example, streets and 
green areas); or possible problems regarding the interpreta-
tion of “agricultural land-use” (some initiators have already 
expressed doubts about the vagueness of such a term; in 
their opinion, this can bring the public agency to behave in 
a discretional manner, and favor some initiators over oth-
ers). 
Only at the end of the development process will it be pos-
sible to assess in detail what has worked and what has failed 
in this particular experiment (and what is tied to specific 
local conditions, and what is instead exportable). Further 
research and evaluation will therefore be necessary as the 
experiment proceeds and on its conclusion to express a 
more thorough critical judgment. As said in the introduc-
tion, the case of Oosterwold is not considered here as a sort 
of “best practice,” but as an interesting experiment that re-
quires assessment and monitoring.
NOTES
1 The term “experimental garden” was used by Esther 
Geuting in September 2014 in an interview. At that time 
Esther Geuting was the area director of Oosterwold, 
working for the municipality of Almere. 
2 For instance, as we will see later, in Oosterwold the 
edge  of each plot must be publicly accessible.
3 From a methodological point of view, to reconstruct 
the case, in addition to the study of official documents 
(for instance the land-use plan, the strategy plan, and 
so on), and of particular websites (e.g. http://maa-
koosterwold.nl/), the research group went three times 
to Almere (September 2014, October 2015 and May 
2016) to see the place and interview the area director of 
Oosterwold Esther Geuting, and Ivonne de Nood (new 
area director since November 2015). In 2014, a meet-
ing with Jeroen Zuidgeest (responsible for the strategic 
project carried out by the MVRDV design firm) was 
organized to understand their choices and motivations. 
4 In Dutch commonly known as Vinex-wijken. VINEX is 
the Dutch abbreviation of the Fourth Policy Document 
on Spatial Planning Extra, the planning document 
1988 which appointed (among other things) the loca-
tions of these suburbia.
5 This is a broad building permit that integrates several 
previously separate permits such as the building per-
mit, demolition permit, and permit for felling trees. 
The shortest “regular procedure” takes eight weeks. The 
building permit is regulated in the General Provisions 
for Environmental Law Act (Wet Algemene bepalingen 
omgevingsrecht, abbreviated as “Wabo”).
6 The map is shared and visible online (http:// 
maakoosterwold.nl). On the map such initiatives are 
marked with four different colors. Each color repre-
sents a specific phase of advancements: (i) declaration 
of interest, (ii) letter of intent, (iii) agreement, (iv) con-
struction.
7 However, exemptions can be made if different initiators 
of plots decide to cooperate and accept the nuisance.








Batty M. 2005. Cities and Complexity. Chicago & Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
Beunen, R. & Van Assche K. 2013. Contested Delineations. Planning, 
Law and the Governance of Protected Areas. Environment and 
Planning A, 45(6): 1285-1301.
Brennan, G. & Buchanan J. M. 2000. The Reason of Rules: 
Constitutional Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Buitelaar, E. 2010. Cracks in the Myth: Challenges to Land Policy 
in The Netherlands. Journal of Economic and Social Geography, 
101(3): 349-356.
Buitelaar, E., Galle, M. & Salet, W. 2013. Third-Party Appeal Rights 
and the Regulatory State: Understanding the Reduction of 
Planning Appeal Options. Land Use Policy, 35: 312-317. 
Buitelaar, E., M. Galle & Sorel, N. 2011. Plan-Led Planning Systems 
in Development-Led Practices: An Empirical Analysis into the 
(Lack of) Institutionalization of Planning Law. Environment and 
Planning A, 43: 928-941.
Buitelaar E., Feenstra S., Galle M., Lekkerkerker J., Sorel N. & 
Tennekes J. 2012. Vormgeven aan de spontane stad: belemmeringen 
en kansen voor organische stedelijke herontwikkeling. Den Haag 
and Amsterdam, Netherlands: Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving/
Urhahn Urban Design.
Buitelaar E., Galle M. & Sorel, N. 2014. The public planning of 
private planning: an analysis of controlled spontaneity in the 
Netherlands. In: Andersson, D. E., & Moroni, S. (Eds.) Cities 
and Private Planning, Property Rights, Entrepreneurship and 
Transaction Costs, Edward Elgar.
Buitelaar, E. & Bregman, A. 2016. Dutch land development 
institutions in the face of crisis: trembling pillars in the planners’ 
paradise. European Planning Studies, 24(7): 1281-1294.
Cammen, H. van de & de Klerk L. 2003. Ruimtelijke ordening: van 
grachtengordel tot Vinex-wijk. Utrecht: Het Spectrum.
Collison 2011. Self-build: it’s time to go Dutch. (http://www.
theguardian.com/money/2011/nov/25/self-build-go-dutch).
Cozzolino, S. 2015a. Il caso di Almere e la nuova sfida urbanistica 
olandese: da un modello blueprint a do it by yourself. In La ricerca 
che cambia. Atti del primo convegno nazionale dei dottorati 
italiani dell’architettura, della pianificazione e del design. Siracusa: 
LetteraVentidue, pp. 288–301.
Cozzolino, S. 2015b. Insights and reflections on Jane Jacobs’ legacy. 
Toward a Jacobsian theory of the city. Territorio, 72: 151-157.
Dutch Lower House, Tweede Kamer. 2010/2011. Vaststelling van 
overgangsrecht en wijziging van diverse wetten ten behoeve van 
de invoering van de Wet algemene bepalingen omgevingsrecht 
(Invoeringswet Wet algemene bepalingen omgevingsrecht). Brief van 
de Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 31 953 nr 39: 1.
Epstein, E. 1995. Simple Rules for a Complex World. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Faludi, A. & van der Valk, A. 1994. Rule and Order. Dutch Planning 
Doctrine in the Twentieth Century. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers.
Flyvbjerg, B. 2006. Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study 
Research. Qualitative Inquiry, 12(2): 219-245. 
Gemeente Almere & Gemeente Zeewolde 2013. Intergemeentelijke 
Structuurvisie Oosterwold. Almere and Zeewolde.
Gordon P. & Ikeda S. 2011. Does Density Matter? InL Andersson D. 
E., Andersson A.E. & Mellander C. (eds.), Handbook of Creative 
Cities. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Hajer, M. & Zonneveld, W. 2000. Spatial Planning in the Network 
Society-Rethinking the Principles of Planning in the Netherlands. 
European Planning Studies, 8(3): 337–355. 
Harper, D. A. & Endres, A. M. 2012. The anatomy of emergence, with 
a focus upon capital formation. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 82(2-3): 352-367. 
Hartmann, T. & Needham, B. 2012. Planning by Law and Property 
Rights Reconsidered. Farnham: Ashgate.
Hayek, F. A. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. The American 
Economic Review, 35 (4): 519-530.
Hayek, F.A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F.A. 1967. The Result of Human Action but not Human Design. 
London: Routledge.
Hakim, B. 2014. Mediterranean Urbanism: Historic Urban/building 
Rules and Processes. Berlin: Springer.
Healey, P. 2004. The Treatment of Space and Place in the New 
Strategic Spatial Planning in Europe. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 28(1): 45-67.
Holcombe, R. G. 2011. Cultivating creativity: market creation of 
agglomeration economies. In: Andersson, D. E., Andersson, A. E., 
& Mellander, C. (Eds.) Handbook of Creative Cities. Northampton: 
Edward Elgar, pp. 387- 402.
Ikeda S. 2004. Urban Interventionism and Local Knowledge.  
The Review of Austrian Economics, 17(2-3): 247-264.
Ikeda S. 2011. Economic Development from a Jacobsian Perspective, 
in Id., How Jane Jacobs Changed the Way We View Urban Life, New 
York: Purchase College, pp. 1-28.
Ikeda, S. 2012. Economic Development from a Jacobsian Perspective. 
In: Hirt, S. (Eds.) The Urban Wisdom of Jane Jacobs. New York: 
Routledge, pp. 63-83.
Ikeda S. & Callahan G. 2014. Jane Jacobs’ Critique of Rationalism in 
Urban Planning, Cosmos + Taxis 1:3 https://cosmosandtaxis.files.
wordpress.com/2014/11/ct_1_3_callahan_ikeda.pdf
Ikeda, S. 2017. A City Cannot be a Work of Art. Cosmos + Taxis 4:2
Jacobs, J. 1961. Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: 
Random House.
Jacobs, J. 1969. The Economies of Cities. New York: Random House.
Jacobs, J. 2000. The Nature of Economies. New York: Random House.
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (I & M). 2011. 
Bezinning op het Omgevingsrecht. Essays over de toekomst van het 
omgevingsrecht. The Hague: I & M. 
Mises, L. 1963/1998. Human Action: A treatise on economics. The 
scholar’s edition. Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Moroni, S. 2007. Città del liberalismo attivo. Torino: CittàStudi.
Moroni, S. 2010. Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Land-Use 
Regulation. Towards Nomocracy. Planning Theory, 9(2): 137-155.
Moroni, S. 2012. Why Nomocracy: Structural Ignorance, Radical 
Pluralism and the Role of Relational Rules. Progress in Planning, 
77(2): 46-59.
Moroni, S. 2103. Afterword: Ethical Problems of Contemporary 
Cities. In: C. Basta, & Moroni S. (Eds.) Ethics, Design and Planning 
of the Built Environment. Berlin: Springer, pp. 197-212.
Moroni, S. 2015. Complexity and the inherent limits of explanation 
and prediction: Urban codes for self-organising cities. Planning 
Theory, 14(3): 248-267.











Moroni S., Buitelaar E., Sorel N. & Cozzolino S. Forthcoming. Simple 
Planning Rules for Complex Urban Problems. Towards Legal 
Certainty for Spatial Flexibility. SPER
MVRDV 2011. Werkboek, Ontwikkelstrategie Oosterwold, 
Werkmaatschappij Oosterwold, Rotterdam.
Municipality of Almere 2009. Structural Vision, Almere 2.0, 
Environmental Planning, Almere.
Nadin, V., Hawkes, P., Cooper, S., Shaw, D. & Westlake, T. 1997. 
The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems. Regional 
Development Studies (28). Brussels: European Commission.
Needham, D. B. 2014. Dutch land use planning: The Principles and the 
Practice. London: Routledge.
Oosterman, A. 2015. The empowerment of ‘self power’. Volume 43: 
104-107.
Oosterman, A. & Retegan, A. 2015. Building your own. Volume 43: 
18-25.
Pennington, M. 2002. Liberating the Land. London: The Institute of 
Economic Affairs.
Polanyi M. 1951/1998. The Logic of Liberty. Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund.
Portugali J. 1999. Self-Organization and the City. Berlin: Springer.
Rauws, W. S. 2015. Why Planning Needs Complexity: toward 
an adaptive approach for guiding urban and peri-Urban 
Transformation. PhD Series InPlanning, book 4. Groningen, The 
Netherlands.
RRAAM, IAK Almere 2.0 & Werkmaatschappij Almere Oosterwold 
2012. Almere Oosterwold Land-Goed voor Initiatieven. 
Sorel, N., Buitelaar, E., Van den Broek, L., Galle, M. & Verwest, F. 
2011. Omgevingsrecht en het proces van gebiedsontwikkling. Den 
Haag: Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving. 
Urhahn Urban Design 2010. The Spontaneous City. Amsterdam: BIS 
Publishers.
WRR (1998). Ruimtelijke ontwikkelingspolitiek. Den Haag: Sdu 
Uitgevers.
